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Abstract

There is a longstanding debate in the economics literature on whether fiscally
decentralized countries are inherently more fiscally unstable. The Great Recession
provides a fertile testing ground for analyzing how the degree of decentralization does
actually affect countries’ ability to implement fiscal stabilization policies in response to
macroeconomic shocks. We provide an empirical analysis aiming at disentangling the
roles played by decentralization design itself and several recently introduced budgetary
institutions such as subnational borrowing rules and fiscal responsibility laws on
country’s fiscal stability. We use OECD countries’ data since 1995, which includes both
a boom period of worldwide economic growth and the Great Recession. Our main finding
is that well-designed decentralized systems are not destabilizing. But, in addition, subnational fiscal and borrowing rules should be at work to improve the overall fiscal
stability performance of decentralized countries.
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1. Introduction
There is a longstanding debate in the fiscal federalism literature on whether
fiscally decentralized countries are inherently more fiscally unstable. For many
years, the orthodoxy received from Musgrave (1959) and Oates (1972) established
that stabilization policy should be an exclusive responsibility of central/federal
governments went unchallenged. Even though this dictum did not directly speak to
the possible impact of fiscal decentralization on macro stability, indirectly it was
taken to mean that fiscally decentralized systems could weaken the ability of central
authorities to maintain macro stability. Indeed, decentralized systems can be more
sensitive to the problems of soft budget constraints, borrowing abuses and bailouts,
as well as deeper challenges including the common pool problem and moral hazard
(Pisauro, 2001). The ability to implement countercyclical fiscal policies may be
further impeded by the lack of sub-national tax autonomy with the presence of large
vertical fiscal imbalances. This consensus impregnated the policy advice of
international institutions such as the IMF or the World Bank as explicitly stated by
several influential contributions (Prud’homme, 1995; Tanzi, 1996, 2006). Thus,
even though fiscal decentralization could be desirable for other reasons – mainly
increasing the efficiency of public expenditures - designers and policy makers were
seen as facing a tradeoff.
However, those early fears about the dangers of fiscal decentralization were
actually not backed by robust empirical evidence (Baskaran, 2010; Neyapti, 2010,
2013; Bartolini et al., 2017). Indeed, overall fiscal management may be enhanced by
the use of fiscal rules regarding deficits and borrowing and other recent budgetary
innovations. Thus, the counterview is that well-designed decentralization systems
and budgetary institutions can actually contribute to the fiscal stability of a country.
The Great Recession provides a fertile testing ground for analyzing how in fact
the degree of decentralization and its design do actually affect countries’ capacity to
implement fiscal stabilization policies in response to exogenous macroeconomic
shocks. In this paper, we provide an empirical analysis aiming at disentangling the
roles played by decentralization design itself and several recently introduced
budgetary institutions such as subnational borrowing rules and fiscal responsibility
laws on country’s fiscal stability. We use OECD countries’ data since 1995, which
includes both a boom period of worldwide economic growth and the Great
recession. Our main finding is that “well-designed” decentralized systems are
stabilizing. In particular, sub-national fiscal and borrowing rules should be at work
to improve overall fiscal stability.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review the
relevant literatures on decentralization and macroeconomic stability. Section 3
provides a first look at the data including references to the experiences of specific
countries. In section 4, we use cross-section time-series analysis to disentangle the
impact of different decentralized fiscal institutions. Section 5 concludes.
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2. Related literature
The orthodoxy of exclusively allocating macro-stability functions to the central
government (Musgrave, 1959; Oates, 1972) has been challenged over the years. Indeed,
a longlist of studies have argued in different ways that devolving some functions for
macroeconomic policy to sub-national governments could actually promote stability
(e.g., Shah, 1994, 1999; Sheikh and Winer, 1977; Gramlich, 1987, 1993; McLure, 1995;
Huther and Shah, 1996; Rodden and Wibbels, 2002). More recently, empirical studies
investigating the actual effect of fiscal decentralization on macroeconomic stability
using cross-country data typically found either no effect or a positive beneficial effect of
the former on the latter (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 2006; Schaltegger and Feld,
2009; Baskaran, 2010; Neyapti, 2010). On a theoretical ground, Shah (2006) provides a
rationale for why fiscally decentralized systems may lead in practice to greater
macroeconomic stability. According to him, fiscally decentralized systems typically
internalize the challenges for macroeconomic control and introduce institutions that can
address the negative incentives brought by the common pool problem, moral hazard and
rent seeking behaviors.
However, overall, the fears that decentralized systems can be destabilizing have
not gone away. One can find country experiences where sub-national governments would
appear to disregard budget constraints aggravating macroeconomic instability (Rodden,
2002 and Rodden, Eskeland and Litvack, 2003), and many others where effective softbudget constraints are a reality (Stein, 1999). Some empirical evidence gives support to
those fears. For example, Fornasari, Webb and Zou (2000) find almost a perfect
correspondence between increases in subnational deficits and central government
expenditures and deficits in the subsequent period.
As part of the recognition that the actual design of fiscal decentralization matters
for its impact on macroeconomic stability, there is also a literature that has explored the
consequences of the lack of tax autonomy (or its other manifestation, the existence of
large vertical fiscal imbalances) on weakening fiscal discipline by subnational
governments. This diminished discipline takes place because of the common pool
problem —the perception of lower costs of spending for subnational governments
because others are footing the bill— and moral hazard and the soft budget constraint —
the perception that the upper level government sourcing the transfers will also bail out the
subnational government in case of need.
There are at least three avenues for the deterioration of subnational fiscal
discipline: by increasing spending, by reducing tax collections or by increasing deficits
and borrowing. Many studies have focused on how lack of tax autonomy leads
subnational governments to spend more freely enlarging the size of their budgets (the
Leviathan hypothesis) that a high vertical fiscal imbalance (VFI) level undermines fiscal
discipline by motivating local governments to further expand their expenditures (e.g.,
Stein, 1999; Jin and Zou, 2002; Rodden, 2003). Fewer studies have looked at the impact
on lower tax effort (e.g., Jin et al., 2017). Several other authors have found evidence that
lower tax autonomy also can lead to fiscal deficits (e.g., de Mello, 2000; Rodden, 2002;
Eyraud and Lusinyan, 2013; Asartyan et al., 2015).
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In more recent times, many countries with decentralized systems have buttressed
their ability to pursue macro stability by introducing three types of interrelated fiscal
institutions: fiscal rules regulating the borrowing behavior of subnational governments,
fiscal responsibility laws, and independent fiscal councils monitoring deficits and
borrowing at all levels of government. It is hard to tell whether these new institutions
reflect the greater ability of decentralized systems to internalize the challenges of
macroeconomic control as emphasized by Shah (2006), or whether they represent ex-post
a recognition of sorts of the dangers posed by decentralized systems to macro stability if
they are allowed run unchecked.
Regarding borrowing rules, Ter-Minassian (2007, 2015) has pioneered their
systematic study but only a few empirical studies have examined the effectiveness of
subnational borrowing regulations (Jin and Zou, 2002; Rodden, 2002; Martinez-Vazquez
and Vulovic, 2017). To date there is no robust evidence on the effectiveness of the
different institutional arrangement for subnational borrowing in delivering fiscal
discipline and macroeconomic stability. As argued by Rodriguez-Pose and Gil (2005),
the gap between fiscal freedoms and responsibilities can cause agency problems leading
to financial disarray, especially when there are not strict regulations for local government
borrowing. One exception for advanced economies is provided by Foremny (2014) who
shows that fiscal rules at the local level could be effective for decreasing public deficits
in European countries (observed over the period 1995-2008) but only in unitary states.
The evidence on the effectiveness of adopting of Fiscal Responsibility Laws (FRLs) is
also mixed in developing countries. Cáceres et al. (2010) using a sample of Latin America
and advanced countries find a positive but limited effect of FRLs on fiscal outcomes. This
is similar to the positive effect on primary balances that de Mello (2005) had found for
the specific case of the Fiscal Responsibility Laws in Brazil. On the other hand, Thornton
(2009) analyzed the impact of FRLs on fiscal discipline in nine emerging market
economies and found no significant effect. In a nutshell, the effectiveness of fiscal and
borrowing rules depends crucially on the constitutional structure of vertical governance
and on how decentralisation is designed and carried out. Poor design and practice may
make fiscal and borrowing rules actually contributors to fiscal instability.
In recent years, fiscal councils have been established as (variably) independent
fiscal authorities to monitor and control fiscal sustainability with a strong foothold in EU
countries. Their focus from the start has been on fiscal discipline of central governments
and much less so of subnational governments, although the latter has been increasingly
occupying these institutions where they have been created. Fiscal councils sprang from
the argument that an independent authority should control government debt and deficits,
with a mandate similar to that of central bank authorities regarding monetary policy (von
Hagen and Harden, 1995). They have been rationalized as an instrument to address the
time inconsistency in fiscal policies between short-run macroeconomic policy
imperatives and the commitment to long-run fiscal performance and sustainability
(Calmfors, 2003; Wyplosz, 2005).
One important drawback of fiscal councils is that governments do not generally
like to be criticized by another governmental organization, no matter how independent
they may be. That helps explain the recent backlash against Hungary’s Fiscal Council.
Two fairly recent reviews about performance and scope of fiscal councils (Calmfors and
Wren-Lewis, 2011; Debrun et al., 2009) give them mixed reviews. Although the perform
ex-ante and ex-post policy assessments and fiscal sustainability analysis, they have been
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less effective to influence deficits and debt levels. Nevertheless, the “watchdog” role of
fiscal councils can contribute to more sustainable fiscal policies at the national and may
make borrowing rules and fiscal responsibility laws more effective at the subnational
level.
Because of the fiscal pains and tribulations associated with the Great Recession,
scholars have looked into the role and effectiveness of fiscal institutions in helping
address the external macroeconomic shock. In this perspective, a recent paper by Bartolini
et al. (2017) contributes to this literature by looking at the impact of fiscal decentralization
on aggregate, central and local budget balances in the presence of financial shocks, such
as banking crises. The main results for a sample of 19 OECD countries over the period
1980-2010 show that during banking crises expenditure decentralization seems to be
beneficial for country’s fiscal discipline. However, such improvement in both aggregate
and central fiscal budgets during financial distress is basically obtained at the expenses
of the sub-national sector through cuts in intergovernmental transfers in order to financing
national public policies necessary to tackle the crisis. This sounds like a familiar theme
to what recently happened to sub-national governments in many advanced economies
when consolidation programs and fiscal adjustment measures have been implemented to
restore national public finances after the financial crisis and during the ongoing economic
downturn (see, for instance, Emmerson and Tetlow, 2015 for UK; Foremny et al., 2017
for OECD countries).
Actually, different fiscal policy strategies were recommended by international
organizations at the beginning of the crisis (e.g., Spilimbergo et al., 2008) with the goal
of making sure that existing public spending programs were not cut for lack of resources.
In particular, for sub-national entities this kind of situation could be mitigated through
transfers from the central government, without having to suspend sub-national
fiscal/borrowing rules (especially given the difficulty of credibly reversing the suspension
later on). In reality, even though central governments could have had several policy
options to face the financial crisis (e.g., implementing fiscal stimuli; engaging in reforms
to accelerating growth) as recently re-stated by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2017), it
seems that many central governments preferred to work mostly on an intense recentralization process – especially on the spending side of the budget. These processes
are documented by recent studies collected by the IEB (2013) for some advanced troubled
economies (among others, Italy and Spain).
More generally, about the role played by the institutions of fiscal federalism in the
outcomes from the Great Recession, it would appear that sub-national governments would
be “too small to matter” from a general government point of view, as recently argued by
Eyraud and Badia (2013). However, this could be true only at first glance, as the authors
provide evidence that sub-national governments did not fully adjust expenditure in
response to negative revenue shocks, contributing to deteriorate the overall fiscal position
of the general government. In fact, during the recent economic crisis local governments
in most European countries increased fiscal deficits in order to offset revenue shortfalls
(and also probably reflecting the political difficulties of reversing past expenditure
increases). Consequently, expenditure decentralization may have created incentives to
overspend in many of these countries. Thus, an important question from the review of the
recent literature, and which we put to the test in this paper, is whether decentralized
institutional arrangements have been effective or improvements will be required to
improve fiscal stability in OECD countries.
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3. A first look at data
The first step of our analysis on the relationship between fiscal stability, the Great
recession and decentralization is to review the relationship between budget balance and
the business cycle. We rely upon a wide sample including the OECD countries over the
period 1995-2015. Our interest is to establish if fiscal reactions to the economic cycle are
standardized or whether there is heterogeneity across countries. The business cycle is
proxied by the output gap estimated by the OECD,1 and the general government primary
budget balance measures fiscal stability over GDP (NLGXQ), also included in the OECD
database.
Figure 1 reports individual scatters for the 32 OECD members, the OECD average
and the UE15 average. In all cases, both the linear regression fit and non-linear nearest
neighbor fit are represented.2 In Table 1 we report the corresponding coefficients and Rsquared from the regression for each country, where the output gap enters the right-hand
side of the equation. In Table 1, countries are ordered according to the values of the
estimated coefficients.
A first lesson to extract from both the figure and the table is that, on average, the
relationship between primary balance and output gap is positive and statistically
significant. The common coefficient for the average of OECD countries is close to unity
(0.91) with a moderate R2 (0.44). The coefficient drops for the EU-15 (0.55) but the model
still works (R2 = 0.37).
However, both individual coefficients and goodness of fit are substantially
different across countries. In some cases, the sensitivity is very strong (Denmark, Spain,
the US) but it is close to zero in Poland, Slovak Republic, Switzerland, Portugal, and
Greece. Moreover, in Hungary the relationship becomes negative. While the goodness of
fit tends to increase with the magnitude of the coefficient, there is also some diversity.
Belgium and The Netherlands are good examples. Finally, linear and non-linear fits are
very different in some cases, supporting the idea of heterogeneity in fiscal reactions to
the economic cycle.

1

In general, the observed deficit is explained by current GDP growth rates, but also on the lagged deficit
and then on economic growth in previous years. The output gap includes information on both the current
and past GDP growth rates.
2
The “nearest neighbor fit” displays local polynomial regressions for two series with bandwidth based on
nearest neighbors. Briefly, for each data point in a sample, we fit a locally weighted polynomial regression.
It is a local regression since we use only the subset of observations which lie in a neighborhood of the point
to fit the regression model; it may be weighted so that observations further from the given data point are
given less weight.
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Figure 1: Relationship between output gap and primary budget balance in OECD countries
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A second step is to combine these previous results to detect the potential
existence of well-defined clusters of countries and if the corresponding groups could be
explained by differences in decentralization. In other words, we try to answer the
following question: Do recessions involve a stronger or weaker effect on deficit when
decentralization is higher?
In particular, we look for clusters combining the coefficients and R2-adjustment
(to measure the stability of the relationship) reported in table 1. Our analysis relies upon
the Average Linkage Clustering method, using the Euclidean distance as the similarity or
dissimilarity measure. The corresponding dendrogram is shown in Figure 2. Then in
Figure 3 we also add a third variable: the extent to which a regional government co–
determines sub-national and national borrowing constraints (source: Hooghe et al.,
2016).3 Country codes are those reported in Table 1.4
When looking for correlations between clusters and the extent of decentralization
in Figure 2, we realize that a significant number of federal and highly decentralized
countries according to the RAI5 are in the first cluster: Australia (1), Belgium (3), Canada
(4) Spain (28), and the US (32). However, this group also includes countries with low
values of the RAI: Ireland (14), UK (31), and Sweden (29). Moreover, other federal or
quasi-federal countries such as Austria (2), Germany (10), Switzerland (30), and Italy
(16) are in different clusters. Hence, how decentralization would shape the relationship
between fiscal stability and the output gap is far from evident. This conclusion remains
when the variable measuring decisions on regional borrowing constraints is included in
the cluster analysis. Figure 3 shows a group of countries including Australia (1), Spain
(28), Austria (2), Belgium (3), and Germany (10). However, Canada (4) and the US (32)
remain close to Ireland (14), the UK (31), and Sweden (29); and far away from the first
group. Finally, Italy (16) and Switzerland (30) are in another different cluster.

3

This variable (namely n_borrowout) is included in the Regional Authority Index (RAI) and it is coded in
the following way:
0: regional governments are not routinely consulted over borrowing constraints
1: regional governments negotiate routinely over borrowing constraints but do not have a veto
2: regional governments negotiate routinely over borrowing constraints
4
All computations are performed using Stata 15.
5
The nine OECD countries with average RAI values over 20 during the period 1995-2010 are Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, and the US.

10

International Center for Public Policy

0

L2 dissimilarity measure
.5

1

Figure 2: Dendrogram for the cluster analysis

1 3 4 34 14 31 28 32 29 9 10 17 20 33 21 6 8 2 27 5 15 18 19 22 23 7 11 25 13 16 24 30 26 12

Source: Authors’ elaborations

0

L2 dissimilarity measure
1
.5

1.5

Figure 3: Dendrogram for the cluster analysis including decisions on regional borrowing
constraints

1 28 2 3 10 4 14 31 29 32 34 9 17 20 6 8 33 5 15 18 19 22 23 27 7 11 25 13 16 24 30 26 21 12

Source: Authors’ elaborations

Fiscal stability during the Great Recession: Putting decentralization design to the test

11

In short, the relationship between decentralization and fiscal stability is more
complex than a simple negative or positive significant bivariate one. One key variable
appears to be the degree of central control over public spending, which depending on
government priorities in each country for specific programs allowed for different degrees
of spending cuts in response to the Great Recession (see Bozio et al., 2015). For example,
local governments in the United Kingdom faced significant spending cuts on their
services imposed by the central government; regions in Spain were constrained by
strengthened national fiscal rules (since 2012), which also led to significant cuts in their
spending (mainly on education and health services). In some cases, like France, the
financial crisis offered the chance to introduce structural reforms, also involving the
intergovernmental finance architecture.
Given the large diversity of responses, we can gain additional insight by looking
deeper into some particular country experiences. Specifically, we focus on two
representative federal and fiscally decentralized countries, Spain and Germany, which
were differently affected by the Great Recession and ended providing quite different
policy responses. In addition, we consider the United Kingdom, which is a federal but
more fiscally centralized country than the previous ones. In the same fashion, we look at
the cases of Italy, Ireland and France as relatively fiscally centralized and unitary states,
which suffered differently from the crisis so implementing quite different policy
responses to face it.
In Spain there was an attempt to tightening legislation on budgetary stability in
6
2011. However, it appeared to have been insufficient by itself (Lago-Peñas, 2015) as this
new and hard legal framework was not enough to guarantee the meeting of fiscal targets
by regions, also revealing its limitations from a political economy standpoint. Moreover,
the several financial instruments implemented by the central government since 2012 to
bridge regional deficits (including deficits over the corresponding target) in a scenario of
closed financial markets has been, in fact, an incentive to fiscal slippage. Another
example of the central government’s intervention as an ex-post response to the crisis in
Spain was the creation of an independent national fiscal agency in 2014.Given the timing,
its impact on fiscal policy is necessarily scarcely significant up to 2015.7
In Italy, the fiscal adjustment programs aimed at reducing public deficit and debt
necessarily involved sub-national governments as regions and municipalities control a
large part of public expenditure and collect sizable autonomous and shared tax revenues
(Bordignon, 2013). This also implied cuts in grants by the central government toward
both local entities and regions, damaging more the former than the latter. 8 However, the
recently abolished taxes at the local level (e.g., the municipal taxation on resident housing
6

The reform of Article 135 of the Spanish Constitution in September 2011 kicked off a profound revision
of the legislation on budgetary stability, which was implemented by Organic Law 2/2012 of April 27 th,
2012, on Budgetary Stability and Financial Sustainability (LOEPSF).
7
However, the general evaluation on this new institution has been mostly positive among experts and
policymakers given the general consensus on the independence and technical capacity of the institution and
its real contribution to the public debate on fiscal stability issues in Spain.
8
This is mostly due to the different protection offered by the national legislation. Indeed, the functions of
regions are stated in the constitution, while it is the central government who determines functions and
financing for municipalities and provinces.
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wealth) were re-introduced.9 At the same time, an important measure directly affecting
regional governments was the linear cuts to the budgets of the regional health authorities
imposed by the central government, and which emerged clearly after 2012.
Likewise, in Spain regions faced difficulties to use revenues to achieve fiscal
targets and they have suffered prediction mistakes of central government on in-advance
payments. More importantly, fiscal strategies were not homogeneous across regions as
some regional governments have been more committed to fiscal targets than others (LagoPeñas, Fernández-Leiceaga and Vaquero, 2017).
In Ireland, a country that experienced the most dramatic impact of the financial
crisis (Keane 2015) and the most relevant deterioration in public finances, important
decentralization measures were introduced ex novo in the middle of the crisis (i.e. the flatrate household charge followed by residential property taxes). To alleviate the effects of
the economic crisis on national accounts, there was also a shift from central grants to local
own-source revenues (Turley and McNena, 2016).10
A similar story can be told for Germany. Indeed, the German public finances were
hit only moderately by the crisis and, as a consequence, not fundamental tax and spending
reforms had to be enacted (for further details, see Blömer et al., 2015). At both central
and sub-central levels, the public sector budget was balanced when the crisis broke out;11
this allowed enough fiscal space for the central government to let the automatic stabilizers
work without worsening state or local fiscal positions.
Likewise, France was modestly hit by the financial crisis, but which in fact
presented an opportunity to introduce a number of structural reforms. Among them, there
were changes to the structure of local governments in order to simply the administrative
system and realize some efficiency gains. More specifically, a national law in 2014
merged the 22 original regions into 13 new regions. However, the savings in
administration costs were only expected to be realized in years to come (André et al.,
2015).
In the United Kingdom, an also relatively high degree of centralization facilitated
central government measures to implement large cuts in public service spending during
the crisis (Emmerson and Tetlow, 2015). In addition, a newly created independent
institution-- the Office for Budget Responsibility-- was engaged to guarantee better postcrisis official fiscal and economic forecasts, in line with the general trend experienced in
other European countries. Indeed, also in France and other countries the most relevant
signal to consolidating public finances after the crisis was the application of fiscal rules
9

Indeed, among the most important consolidation measures implemented in 2012 affecting the sub-national
sector, there were revenue increases coming from the municipal property tax IMU and the Domestic
Stability Pact governing local government spending (see Denk, 2013 for further details).
10
Specifically, in 2014 the Local Government Reform Act reformed the intergovernmental fiscal relations
by fostering local authority expenditures and income generation, so leading to lower vertical fiscal
imbalance, and greater local autonomy. Some differences persist across councils with respect to
dependency on central government versus self-reliance on local revenue sources, giving rise to horizontal
fiscal imbalances.
11
Indeed, in years before the crisis Germany implemented a series of measures to improve the structural
position of its public finances (due subject to an excessive deficit procedure by the European Commission
in 2002) which culminated in 2007 with a balanced budget, which was expected to be maintained in the
medium term.
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(Luechinger and Schaltegger, 2013), also inspired by the Swiss debt brake in 2003
(Danninger, 2002), and sometimes extended to all levels of government (e.g., Germany).

4. A Time-Series Cross-Section (TSCS) analysis
To this point, we have seen that within our sample of countries for the last two
decades the relationship between the macroeconomic cycle and fiscal balance is not
uniform but rather quite heterogeneous. We have also seen that it is not possible to cluster
the different responses across countries by their degree of decentralization. Indeed, a
deeper look into some of the countries reveals a variety of factors and behavioral
responses that shed considerable light into the primary heterogeneity observed in the
responses. In this section, we advance our exploration of the relationship between fiscal
stability, decentralization and fiscal rules using cross-section data for the OECD countries
over the period 1995-2014 (with some gaps), taking advantage of previous studies which
analyze the determinant of governments’ fiscal performance and budget balances (e.g.,
Bohn, 1998; Eyraud and Lusinyan, 2013; Presbitero et al., 2014; Mauro et al., 2015).
Our aim is to test two basic hypotheses on the impact of fiscal decentralization on
macroeconomic stability. First, that fiscal decentralization design, in particular, providing
subnational government with fiscal autonomy leads to improved stabilization outcomes
via increased fiscal indiscipline. Second, the added presence of borrowing and fiscal rules
further and independently works to enhance stability.
4.1 Specification
The general econometric specification is the following:
𝑁𝐿𝐺𝑋𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜌𝑁𝐿𝐺𝑋𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑉_𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑃𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑡 +
+𝜓𝑚 ∑𝑚 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑚𝑖𝑡 +𝛾𝑗 ∑𝑗 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑘 ∑𝑘 𝑅𝑈𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

[1]

As in the previous section, NLGXQ stands for general government primary balance (as a
percentage of GDP). We use primary balance to proxy country’ fiscal stability as this
indicator represents a more direct measure of the budgetary policy in the hands of
governments, not including the cost for servicing the debt. The variable GDPV_ANNPCT
is the GDP growth rate at constant prices computed by the OECD.12 Vector POL includes
two political variables: the electoral cycle and the ideology of the incumbent. The former
is a dummy equal to 1 if there was a legislative election in that year; the latter refers to
the chief executive party orientation. Specifically, we create a dummy equal to 1 if the
incumbent government is leftist and 0 otherwise. Vector DEC comprises several fiscal
decentralization indicators. In particular, we use measures of expenditure decentralization
computed by the OECD, and tax autonomy and borrowing autonomy belonging to the
Regional Authority Index (RAI) by Hooghe et al. (2016).
Finally, vector RULES embodies three dummy variables - capturing the existence
of fiscal rules concerning budget balance at supranational, national, and subnational
12

Since the lagged endogenous is included among regressors, we rely upon GDP growth rates rather than
the output gap as in the bivariate relationships in previous section. Note that the lagged endogenous variable
already captures the effect of the past GDP growth rates on the deficit.
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levels - and a fiscal rule index taking into account a more comprehensive approach based
on the effectiveness and strength of the rules. More concretely, the first two dummies are
based on the IMF database which exploits country-specific information at the national
and supranational levels. The subnational fiscal rule dummy is built by taking advantage
of the European Commission database, which provides detailed information for this lower
level of government over time; official country reports are used to build the same dummy
for non-EU members in our sample. In both cases, the dummy is coded 1 if there was a
budget balance rule at the subnational level in the specific year. Finally, the composite
fiscal rule index as computed by the EC has the advantage of taking into account different
dimensions of fiscal rules, beyond their mere existence.13 Overall, the highest is the score,
the strictest is the rule. There are some limitations associated with this index. First, we
are not able to disentangle the impact of rules at different government levels as the index
provides coverage for the entire general government finances;14 and second, the index
covers only EU countries.
In order to deal with idiosyncratic time-invariant factors, a set of individual fixed
effects is included. Second, period fixed effects are also incorporated to capture common
shocks. Finally, the lagged endogenous is added to the right-hand of the equation to deal
with dynamics. Table 2 reports acronyms, definitions and data sources of all those
variables. Due to potential multicollinearity issues (as indicated by correlations in Table
3), we discard the concurrent inclusion of all variables and use different combinations of
factors belonging to both vectors (especially in the case of DEC and RULES vectors).
Table 2: Variables, definitions and data sources
Variable

Definition

Data source

General government primary balance (% GDP).

OECD
(Economic
Outlook
database)

GDPV_ANNPCT

Output gap of the total economy

OECD
(Economic
Outlook
database)

ELECTIONS

Dummy variable. It is coded 1 in legislative election years
and 0 otherwise

WB Database of
Political
Institutions

LEFT

Dummy variable. It is coded 1 if the incumbent is leftist and
0 otherwise

WB - Database
of Political
Institutions

NLGXQ

13

For instance, these issues are considered: the legal base of the rule; the room for revising objectives; the
mechanisms of monitoring compliance and enforcement of the rule; the media visibility of the rule.
Ultimately, these scores are aggregated into the composite index following the methodology proposed by
Deroose et al. (2006).
14
A scheme of different weights is used when more rules apply to the same general government sub-sector.
This weighting is adopted to reflect decreasing marginal benefit of multiple rules applying to the same subsector of general government.
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EXPENDEC

Share of consolidated sub-national expenditure over general
government expenditure (%).

OECD (Fiscal
Decentralization
database)

FISCALAUTO

The extent to which a regional government can independently
tax its population: 0: central government sets base and rate of
all regional taxes. 1: regional government sets the rate of
minor taxes 2: regional government sets base and rate of
minor taxes 3: regional government sets the rate of at least
one major tax: personal income, corporate, value added, or
sales tax 4: regional government sets base and rate of at least
one major tax.

Hooghe et al.
(2016)

BORROWAUTO

The extent to which a regional government can borrow: 0: the
regional government does not borrow (e.g. centrally imposed
rules prohibit borrowing) 1: the regional government may
borrow under prior authorization (ex ante) by the central
government and with one or more of the following centrally
imposed restrictions: a. golden rule (e.g. no borrowing to
cover current account deficits) b. no foreign borrowing or
borrowing from the central bank c. no borrowing above a
ceiling d. borrowing is limited to specific purposes 2: the
regional government may borrow without prior authorization
(ex post) and under one or more of a), b), c), 3: the regional
government may borrow without centrally imposed
restrictions.

Hooghe et al.
(2016)

BORROWCON

The extent to which a regional government co–determines
subnational and national borrowing constraints: 0: regional
governments are not routinely consulted over borrowing
constraints 1: regional governments negotiate routinely over
borrowing constraints but do not have a veto 2: regional
governments negotiate routinely over borrowing constraints

Hooghe et al.
(2016)

BBRSUPRA

Dummy variable coded 1 if a Supranational Budget Balance
Rule (BBR) applies and 0 otherwise

IMF (Fiscal
Rules Dataset)

BBRNATIONAL

Dummy variable coded 1 if a National Budget Balance Rule
(BBR) applies and 0 otherwise

IMF (Fiscal
Rules Dataset)

BBRSUBNATIONAL

Dummy variable coded 1 if a Subnational Budget Balance
Rule (BBR) applies and 0 otherwise

European
Commission
(Fiscal Rules
Database) and
own
elaborations on
official country
reports

FRINDEX

Fiscal Rules Index. Data is only available for EU countries.
The strictest the rule, the highest the score.

European
Commission
(Fiscal Rules
Database)
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Table 3: Simple correlation. Stacked sample. Pairwise samples.
(1)
(1)NLGXQ

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

1

(2)GDPV_ANNPCT

0.15

1

(3)ELECTIONS

-0.06

0.03

1

(4)LEFT

0.03

0.02

-0.01

1

(5)EXPENDEC

0.24

-0.05

0.03

0.06

1

(6)FISCALAUTO

0.23

-0.19

0.04

0.05

0.70

1

(7)BORROWAUTO

0.13

-0.20

0.02

0.17

0.50

0.79

1

(8)BORROWCON

0.06

-0.06

0.02

-0.04

0.17

0.30

0.25

1

(9)BBRSUPRA

-0.05

-0.13

-0.04

-0.05

-0.17

-0.11

-0.02

0.12

1

(10)BBRNATIONAL

0.18

-0.07

0.01

-0.03

0.30

0.14

0.06

0.25

-0.11

1

(11)BBRSUBNATIONAL

0.12

-0.13

0.02

-0.16

0.19

0.40

0.40

0.09

-0.47

0.11

1

(12)FRINDEX

0.08

-0.09

0.05

-0.16

0.35

0.13

0.05

0.07

0.20

0.51

0.05

Notes: Correlations over 0.50 in bold.

Table 4 reports basic descriptive statistics. Given the unbalanced panel nature of
our database - mostly due to missing information15 -, we choose to report results only for
the common balanced sample (317 observations). In any case, depending on the variables
included in the different regression specifications, the number of valid observations
increases up to 518.

15

In particular, variables from the RAI database are available up to 2010, political variables until 2012 and
FRINDEX only for the EU countries.

1
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Table 4: Summary statistics. Individual samples.
Variable

Mean

Median

Maximum

Minimum

Standard deviation

Observations

NLGXQ

-0.20

-0.04

15.8

-29.8

3.89

643

GDPV_ANNPCT

2.54

2.62

11.9

-14.4

3.03

674

ELECTIONS

0.29

0.00

1.00

0.00

0.45

576

LEFT

0.33

0.00

1.00

0.00

0.47

680

EXPENDEC

30.8

29.9

69.2

4.86

14.9

550

FISCALAUTO

1.59

1.00

5.07

0.00

1.66

512

BORROWAUTO

1.43

1.04

4.00

0.00

1.26

512

BORROWCON

0.23

0.00

2.00

0.00

0.57

512

BBRSUPRA

0.61

1.00

1.00

0.00

0.49

620

BBRNATIONAL

0.43

0.00

1.00

0.00

0.49

620

BBRSUBNATIONAL

0.62

1.00

1.00

0.00

0.49

304

FRINDEX

0.36

0.24

3.14

-1.01

0.96

420

4.2 Econometric issues
The preliminary estimates confirm that period effects were highly significant. The
lagged dependent variable is also very significant in most cases. While autocorrelation
fades once period fixed effects and lagged dependent variable are included,
contemporaneous correlation in residuals do not. Hence, we choose to replace standard
OLS errors by Panel Corrected standard errors, robust to both cross correlation and crosssection heteroscedasticity (Beck and Katz, 1995). Concerning the individual fixed effects,
the corresponding F-tests show their relevance. Moreover, a Hausman test revealed that
the fixed-effect option is preferred. The potential endogeneity of the variable
GDPV_ANNPCT - due to the demand effects of fiscal policy -, is discussed below.
As it is known, autoregressive models with fixed effects lead to biased parameter
estimates (Nickell, 1981). However, this bias is of O(1/T). Hence, if T is 2 or 3, the bias
is severe, but it becomes small when T is 20 or more, as in our case (Beck and Katz,
2011). Moreover, according to Monte Carlo evidence obtained in previous works by both
authors, the usual corrections for this bias (Anderson-Hsiao and Kiviet estimators) does
not perform better than the Least Squares Dummy Variables (LSDV) for the T’s seen
typically in TSCS analysis (20 or more). Furthermore, on the negative side of those
alternatives, most often it is hard to find good instruments (Anderson-Hsiao), or it
becomes hard to combine with other methods to deal with problems such as
contemporaneous correlation (Kiviet). Hence, Beck and Katz (2011) do not hesitate to
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recommend OLS when country-specific intercepts must be adjoined to the specification
of a TSCS model (Beck and Katz, 2011).16
In sum, in Table 5 we use the LSDV estimator but additionally we check the
robustness of the results using several alternatives for estimation in Table 6. In particular,
in column (2b) we replicate column (2) in Table (5) but we drop the individual fixed
effects. As expected, the R2 value is lower than in Table 5 but the difference is not
dramatic and the results regarding the estimated coefficients and their statistical
significance hold.17 Finally, in column (2c) the variable GDPV_ANNPCT is dropped to
check the sensitivity of results to the potential endogeneity of this regressor. Our results
still hold.
4.3 Empirical results
The general picture in tables 5 and 6 delivers the same key message. First, the
effect of the GDP growth rate is moderate and only marginally significant across
specifications. Second, political variables are not statistically significant and then dropped
from the model to increase the number of available common observations to perform
econometric estimates.18

16

More recently, Allison et al. (2017) and Moral-Benito et al. (2017) show the poor finite properties of
panel GMM estimators (in particular, the Arellano-Bond estimator) when N is small, as in our case. Hence,
they propose a new maximum likelihood estimator (implemented in Stata code as xtdpdml), but they
recognize that this estimator tends to work best when panels are strongly balanced, T is relatively small
(e.g. less than 10), and there are no missing data. In fact, using the software STATA 15 we re-estimated
our specification, but both computation and convergence problems arose. Hence, we choose to discard it.
17
We use column (2) as the benchmark for the robustness analysis because the sample is maximized.
18
The number of observations increases from 462 (1) to 518 (2) mostly because of the time span extends
up to 2014. The lack of statistical significance of ELECTIONS hold when it was coded 1 in pre-election
years and 0 otherwise.
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Second, the effects of decentralization variables go in the expected direction but
they are not particularly robust. The coefficient of EXPENDEC is generally positive and
statistically significant.19 Hence, fiscal stability tends to improve with expenditure
decentralization. However, tax decentralization is not statistically significant. Such
different effect between expenditure and revenue decentralization might be due to the fact
that, at least in advanced economies, we observe the presence of asymmetric
decentralization based on higher values of the former compared to values of the latter
(Blochliger and Vammalle 2012).
While BORROWAUTO is not statistically significant, BORROWCON is negative
and significant. Its negative sign means that the extent to which regional governments
contribute to co–determine subnational and national borrowing constraints affects fiscal
imbalance in a negative manner. Although collaboration and consultation among levels
of government regarding borrowing limits may be attractive, it appears to also carry
significant risks.
Concerning fiscal rules, both national and supranational budget balance rules are
positively related to fiscal stability, and the effect of the former is more robust across
specifications. However, the dummy variable capturing the existence of budget balance
rules at the subnational level is not statistically significant. This means that rules working
at the subnational sector appear not to be as effective for the country’s fiscal performance.
This result is not surprising considering the findings in the previous literature (e.g.,
Debrun et al., 2008; Eyraud et al., 2012; Bartolini et al., 2017). In this regard, Kotia and
Lledo (2016) recently argue that to get a discipline-enhancing effect via subnational fiscal
rules, differences in revenue and spending assignments across levels of government
should be small, i.e. the vertical fiscal imbalances should be not large.
Finally, the variable FRINDEX is positive and highly significant in our
estimations: the stricter the rule, the lower the deficit. Additionally, the results in column
(5), which are focused on the period 2008-2014, are very interesting. While the statistical
significance of all variables substantially drops in comparison with column (4), reflecting
the breakdown of the structural relationships due to the Great Recession, the FRINDEX
remains highly significant. This might also suggest that, to properly disentangle the fiscal
rules effect, a more complex and comprehensive indicator is needed to go beyond the de
jure existence of a budget balance rule. That is, the mere existence of fiscal rules might
not imply governments’ effective commitment leading to implement sounder fiscal
policies.
Summarizing, the level of decentralization does not challenge fiscal stability. On
the contrary, we find that the level of expenditure decentralization contributes positively
to fiscal stability. However, an active role played by subnational governments in defining
borrowing constraints may result in less fiscal stability. Most importantly, the presence
of fiscal rules and borrowing limits do appear to really matter, significantly contributing
to greater fiscal stability.
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The exception is column (5) where we reduce the sample to the period 2008-2014 to focus on the crisis
period.
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6. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we revisit the question of whether fiscally decentralized countries
are inherently more fiscally unstable by taking advantage of the strong tests that the
macroeconomic and fiscal shocks associated with the Great Recession represent.
Actually, we use data for OECD countries since 1995, which allows to include both a
boom period of worldwide economic expansion as well as the Great recession.
There is little question that poorly designed fiscal decentralization systems can
add to macroeconomic instability. Numerous country examples over the last several
decades have shown that. Theoretically, decentralization systems with large vertical
imbalances between spending responsibilities and revenue autonomy can lead to fiscal
indiscipline in the form of low tax effort, excessive spending, and irresponsible borrowing
behavior. An important antidote for many of these problems is to significantly increase
the fiscal autonomy of subnational governments, thus reducing vertical fiscal imbalances
and with it, the perverse incentives toward fiscal indiscipline. However, good design with
fiscal autonomy may not be a sufficient condition for responsible overall fiscal behavior
of subnational governments. There can still be powerful political economy incentives for
subnational authorities to over borrow and overspend. Thus, subnational borrowing and
fiscal rules may be needed in order to guarantee good results in terms of macroeconomic
stability.
In our empirical analysis using the OECD data we aim first at disentangling the
role played by decentralization design itself. Second, we analyze the potential role played
by several relatively recent budgetary institutions, such as subnational borrowing rules
and fiscal responsibility laws, on country’s fiscal stability. The first step of our analysis
is to review the relationship between fiscal stability and the economic cycle. Our aim is
to examine whether fiscal reactions (measured by the general government primary budget
balance over GDP) to the economic cycle across countries (measured by the output gap)
are standardized or whether there is heterogeneity. Our empirical findings support the
idea of heterogeneity in fiscal reactions to the economic cycle. A second step in our
analysis is to combine those heterogeneous results to detect the potential existence of
well-defined clusters of countries and whether those clusters could be explained by
differences in decentralization. Here we conclude that it is far from evident for how
decentralization shapes the relationship between fiscal stability and the output gap, as
demonstrated by the experiences of Germany, Italy, Ireland and Spain. It is not only that
the size of the macroeconomic shock differed considerably across countries and that their
decentralized institutions greatly differ or how they changed in response to the shock, but
the political will by central authorities to intervene and utilize the existing fiscal
legislation and institutions demonstrates significant variations. There is also
heterogeneity in how subnational jurisdictions respond within each country.
We conduct time-series cross-section (TSCS) analysis to advance our exploration
of the relationship between fiscal stability, decentralization and fiscal rules using data for
the OECD countries over the period 1995-2014, taking advantage of previous studies
which analyze the determinant of governments’ fiscal performance and budget balances.
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Our main finding is that well-designed decentralized systems are not destabilizing. In
addition, fiscal and borrowing rules can significantly contribute to improve overall fiscal
stability.
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